637

On Legal Scholarship: Questions for
Judge Harry T. Edwards
By Ronald K.L. Collins

[S]ome of the worst eﬀects of the problems that I see in legal education [are]: faculty hiring
that is tilted in favor of “impractical” scholars; inattention to written work, clinical training, and
ethics; an increasing number of law teachers who hold the profession in disdain; a proliferation of
legal scholarship that does not aim to serve the profession; and a growing inattention to the needs
of the disadvantaged.—Harry T. Edwards, May 19, 19971

The life of Judge Harry T. Edwards2 is one very much steeped in writing.
His passion dates back at least to his years at Uniondale High School when he
was the editor of the school newspaper. In the legal realm, that passion traces
back to 1964 and his days on the Michigan Law Review when he published two
student Notes.3 In the half-century since then, Judge Edwards has authored
six books and more than 90 scholarly articles or essays.4 As a lawyer, educator,
administrator, arbitrator, and now jurist, Harry Edwards has put his ideas
into print concerning an array of subjects. For example, he has written on
administrative law, aﬃrmation action, arbitration, civil rights, federal courts,
empiricism, federalism, forensic science, higher education law, judging, labor
law, lawyering, legal education, racial justice, and sex discrimination, among
other topics.5
Important as his contributions to the law have been in those areas, what
sparked the most attention with law professors, judges, and lawyers was his
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1992 law review article titled The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and
the Legal Profession.6 That article is said to be one of the most-cited law review
articles of all time,7 and was the subject of an entire symposium issue in the
Michigan Law Review.8 Since then, the Judge has continued to write in this ﬁeld,9
most recently in a 2014 piece in the Virginia Law Review.10 Not surprisingly,
Judge Edwards’ latest round of arguments continues to draw praise11 in some
quarters and critical attention12 in others.
However one values the Edwards line of argument on law and legal
scholarship, his thoughts have become, and remain, essential reading
in the dialogue and debate over the principles and purposes of modern
scholarship in the legal academy. In one form or another, they have found a
sympathetic ear among the likes of Chief Justice John Roberts13 and Second
Circuit Judge Dennis Jacobs,14 among others.15 Even so, others are much
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less sympathetic,16 while still others both agree and disagree with him in part.17
The upshot? Judge his views as you will; term them too ﬁxed or too ﬂuid; or
commend or condemn them. It is, nonetheless, a fact: Judge Edwards’ article
“certainly hit a nerve.”18
If works such as Holmes’ The Path of the Law19 have taught those of us in
the legal academy anything, it is this: Provocative propositions and unsettling
arguments should, when thoughtfully advanced, prompt us to pause and
rethink how we size up life and law. After all, one does not have to be a
convert to an argument to feel the sting of its truth. By that measure, and
for that reason, among others, I invited Judge Edwards to reply to a set of
questions—some autobiographical, others analytical—about legal scholarship.
He graciously agreed, and his responses to most of them are set out below.

Edwards: I want to make it clear at the outset that some of my answers
to the questions posed below have been drawn directly from some
of my earlier works. I cannot improve much on what I said in those
articles, so I have not tried. Indeed, I prefer not to have anything
published that will detract from what I tried to say in those pieces.
Collins: Your legal scholarship writing goes back more than a halfcentury to your days on the law review at the University of Michigan
Law School. And you began writing books nearly four decades ago.
Today you continue to till these ﬁelds while turning out judicial
opinions. Why? What is it about legal writing that so impassions you?
Edwards: I have always enjoyed writing. As a young boy, I used
to write stories for my personal amusement. In high school I was
the editor of the school newspaper. And the vast majority of my
undergraduate courses at Cornell University involved heavy writing
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See, e.g., Louis H. Pollak, The Disjunction Between Judge Edwards and Professor Priest, 91 MICH. L.
REV. 2113 (1993); Paul Brest, Plus ça Change, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1945 (1993); and Kevin M.
Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Judge Harry Edwards: A Case in Point, 80 WASH. U. L. Q. 1275
(2002).
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See, e.g., James J. White, Letter to Judge Harry Edwards, 91 MICH. L. REV. 2177 (1993). Consider
also Professor Stephen Vladeck’s comments: “Whether or not we agree with this sentiment,
the salient issue to those who ﬁnd this trend disturbing must be whether our scholarship
is both accessible to judges and applicable to the disputes before them. Thus, I ﬁnd
the suggestion that at least some legal scholarship should aspire to be useful to judges
entirely unobjectionable, and the complaint that it isn’t doing so one that merits sustained
reﬂection.” Stephen Vladeck, The Law Reviews vs. the Courts: Two Thoughts From the Ivory Tower, 39
CONNTEMPLATIONS 1, 2 (2007) (citations omitted).
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requirements. When I attended law school, I was required to learn a
new style of writing, which I found to be intriguing.
In my view, “legal writing” at its best is precise, carefully reasoned,
and well-supported (by both facts and governing principles). It should
not be meandering, pointless, frivolous, or pedantic. It is wonderfully
challenging because, often, your aim is to address a diﬃcult issue and
convince others to understand and embrace the view that you are
espousing. I enjoy every facet of writing—the thought and research
that precedes the actual writing; the task of organizing your thoughts;
the work involved in drafting your position; and, ﬁnally, the important
chore of editing for clarity and accuracy. I never want anyone to be
confused about what I have written, even when they may disagree
with what I have to say.
Writing always has been my preferred method of communication.
People can distort anything that you have to say, whether written or
spoken, but you are better able to defend a position in retrospect if it
is committed to writing. This puts pressure on you, however, to write
with precision and clarity. I enjoy the challenge.
Collins: You have written some 15 articles or essays that pertain to one
aspect or another of race and the law. Why? What drew you to that
topic?
Edwards: Matters having to do with “race and the law” have consumed
society during my lifetime. Our country has struggled with issues of
race discrimination in employment, voting, education, and criminal
justice; racial stereotyping in all walks of life; and profound disputes
over preferential remedies and aﬃrmative action to cure the lasting
eﬀects of race bias. I felt the eﬀects of race bias when I was growing
up, and I certainly experienced it ﬁrsthand when I was in law school.
The interesting question is not why I was drawn to write about some
of these subjects, but why I did not write more.
When I was an undergraduate student at Cornell University, there
were only a handful of African American students at the school. Across
the country the few “Negroes” who attended the elite, predominantly
white schools often were seen as “diﬀerent,” both from white students
and from other blacks. Indeed, I heard this from a number of my
undergraduate classmates. I was viewed as having “made it” despite
my race. I was told that I was the exception to whom the stereotype
of inferiority did not apply. It was quite bizarre to listen to comments
such as these, and it was a challenge to overcome the not-so-subtle
racist digs.
When I entered the University of Michigan Law School in 1962,
I was the only African American in my class. I graduated very high
in my law school class, earning a number of honors for academic
achievement. Nevertheless, when I ﬁnished law school, many major
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law ﬁrms to which I applied for jobs rejected me. I was told quite
frankly by some of the hiring partners that, despite my strong academic
record, the ﬁrms would not hire a Negro. It was only when my white
mentor, Michigan law Professor Russell Smith, pressed on my behalf
that I received a job oﬀer from a major Chicago law ﬁrm.
In 1969 and 1970, students at the University of Michigan engaged
in protests and demanded that the law school hire a black faculty
member. It was because of these protests that I was recruited to teach
at Michigan in 1970. In 1975, I was invited to join the faculty at Harvard
Law School under similar circumstances. In 1977, I was appointed to
the Board of Directors of Amtrak, where I later was elected Chairman,
because President Carter was determined to give qualiﬁed African
Americans access to high government positions. And in 1980, I was
appointed to the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit,
in part because the Carter administration was determined to put more
qualiﬁed African Americans on the bench.
So why did I not opt to write even more than I did on “race and the
law?” Part of the answer is that, when I ﬁrst joined the legal academy,
African American scholars faced the great risk of being marginalized
and discredited if we focused on subjects having to do with race and
the law. There were very few minority law professors in those days,
and many were hired only grudgingly. So it mattered—to us, to the
students who saw us as role models, and to the institutional integrity
of the schools at which we taught—that we succeed in the legal
academy. At least in those early days, I and other African American
legal scholars had the clear sense that we should teach and write about
mainstream subjects in order to be taken seriously. As it turned out for
me, I focused on my areas of specialty (labor and employment law,
collective bargaining, negotiation, and higher education law), which
I enjoyed immensely.
I wrote, as did many other minority scholars, on “race and the law”
issues, even as we specialized in other subjects. It was impossible to
ignore the issues that sometimes seemed intractable. Because of our
life experiences, many African American scholars have something to say
about “race and the law,” even if our principal teaching and scholarly
work is in other areas.
It was not until 2004, however, in The Journey from Brown v. Board of
Education to Grutter v. Bollinger: From Racial Assimilation to Diversity, that
I seriously attempted to draw on my own personal and professional
experiences to reﬂect on racial equality and inequality in the
United States and ponder the consequences of the shift from racial
assimilation to diversity as a means of achieving racial equality. This
was a particularly rewarding project because my son, Brent Edwards,
who is a professor of comparative literature at Columbia University,
collaborated with me on a piece of it.
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Fortunately, we have reached a point in the legal academy where
many law professors—female, male, minority, and nonminority—focus
on race and the law and other civil rights issues in their teaching and
scholarship.
Collins: Since 1979 you have written some 17 articles on the legal
profession, the legal academy, and the relationship between the two.
Again, why? And what drew you to that topic?
Edwards: I joined the bench in 1980. Before my appointment, I had
gained signiﬁcant experience as a practicing lawyer and as a member
of the legal academy: I had practiced law for ﬁve years in Chicago
with a major law ﬁrm, taught law at the University of Michigan and
Harvard Law School (earning tenure at both schools), served for a
decade as a neutral labor arbitrator, and published several books and
numerous articles. My appointment to the D.C. Circuit aﬀorded me an
opportunity to think seriously about the work of the legal profession
and the legal academy, and, in particular, the relationship between the
two.
I have always taught while serving on the bench—it has been
enriching because my work as a judge enhances my teaching, and
vice versa. After more than a decade on the bench, however, I was
dismayed with some of what I was seeing in the legal profession and
in the legal academy. I gave vent to my concerns when I published
The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession. My
general thesis was this:
I have been deeply concerned about the growing disjunction
between legal education and the legal profession. I fear that our law
schools and law ﬁrms are moving in opposite directions. The schools
should be training ethical practitioners and producing scholarship
that judges, legislators, and practitioners can use. The ﬁrms should
be ensuring that associates and partners practice law in an ethical
manner. But many law schools—especially the so-called “elite”
ones—have abandoned their proper place, by emphasizing abstract
theory at the expense of practical scholarship and pedagogy. Many
law ﬁrms have also abandoned their place, by pursuing proﬁt above
all else. While the schools are moving toward pure theory, the ﬁrms
are moving toward pure commerce, and the middle ground—ethical
practice—has been deserted by both.

The reactions from the bench, bar, and academy were more than
anything I ever anticipated. One of my former colleagues at the
University of Michigan Law School, who will remain unnamed, sent
me a funny and poignant letter which said something like: “Obviously,
you hit a nerve. And what is so amusing is that the members of the
academy cannot simply dismiss your critique because you are a
member of the academy and know what goes on in our ranks.” The
Disjunction piece was cited in Fred Shapiro and Michelle Pearse’s The
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Most-Cited Law Review Articles of All Time, so I guess that more than a few
people have read it. I have been gratiﬁed—even to see some of the
critical commentary that the article has drawn—because I know that at
least some members of the academy and legal profession are focused
on the issues. I have continued to write on this subject because I feel
that it is incredibly important, and there are still issues to be resolved.
Collins: Nearly a quarter-century ago, you observed: “I fear that our
law schools and law ﬁrms are moving in opposite directions.” And
in a 1997 speech published in the New York University Law Review, you
quoted from a December 23, 1992, letter the late Charles Alan Wright
sent you, wherein he wrote: “Legal education is moving away from the
needs of the legal profession, it is doing so at an increasing pace, and
this is a great loss.”20 Has the situation improved in any meaningful
way since then or is it worse?
Edwards: There are still many serious problems that we are facing
in the legal academy and the legal profession. The problems are
somewhat diﬀerent from the problems that I discussed in 1992, but
they are no less signiﬁcant.
There are still law professors who express disdain for the practice
of law, and oﬀer no concrete proposals for reform. In my view, this is
unacceptable. In constructing a vision of legal education, I agree with
Professor J.B. White, who once wrote that, in order for legal academic
work “to be of value to the law it is essential that the work in question
express interest in, and respect for, the possibilities of what lawyers . . .
do.”21 This means that a good body of legal scholarship must address
law’s purpose of serving society. Not all legal scholarship, but a good
body of it.
There are a number of skeptics who see legal education as a failing
enterprise. Professor Brian Tamanaha recently wrote that “[v]olumes
of material are being written by law professors that appear to leave
little or no trace . . . . Riding one intellectual fad after another, law
professors are spinning wheels going nowhere.”22 Professor Tamanaha
says that this is because law professors have “no obligation to produce
scholarship that is useful for judges and lawyers—although law
professors are best positioned, with subject matter expertise and the
luxury of time, to provide this essential service to the legal system.
Most professors in most academic ﬁelds, like law professors, write for
each other.”23 This is a harsh critique, but hardly unfounded.
20.

A New Vision, supra note 1, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. at 568 (1997), quoting from letter from Charles Alan
Wright to Harry T. Edwards 1 (Dec. 23, 1992) (on ﬁle with author).
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22.
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Beyond the ongoing debates over legal scholarship, law schools are
now also facing a number of critics who question the value of legal
education and suggest that major reforms are necessary. And law
school applications are down, in part due to the economic crisis in
the legal profession. These realities have caused some law schools to
overhaul their curriculums or take innovative steps to make course
oﬀerings more relevant to the needs of the profession.
Some of the steps taken have been for the better. For example, law
schools have made signiﬁcant investments in expanding their clinical
oﬀerings—and not just oﬀering more options, but making clinics
useful, productive, and educational. Good clinical instruction is
diﬃcult and expensive, so it is encouraging to see the genuine eﬀorts
made by a number of law schools to improve their clinical oﬀerings.
We have also seen some sustained interest in legal education reforms
encompassing a broad range of strategies and proposals. For example,
more and more academics and practitioners have suggested reforming
the third year of law school by having students focus on experiential
learning and/or major research and writing projects. Recently, several
professors at Harvard Law School conducted a survey of law ﬁrm
practitioners to determine what business courses should be oﬀered
to law students to better prepare them for law practice. It is unclear
whether any of the current ideas for curriculum reforms will be adopted
in the legal academy. It is encouraging, however, that members of the
academy and the profession are at least addressing some of the serious
issues that now face legal education.
I continue to be optimistic in my outlook, possibly because I
cherish the best ideals of the legal academy and the legal profession. I
am unwilling to believe that we will not ﬁx the problems that we now
face in legal education and the profession. Democracy in the United
States depends upon our commitment to the rule of law, and good
legal education helps to ensure that our commitment never wavers.
Members of the legal academy certainly have the capacity, and
hopefully the vision, to embrace whatever reforms may be necessary
to achieve and maintain excellence in legal education.
Collins: Few of the so-called “better” law schools hire applicants
who have had more than a couple of years in practice, if that. As you
know, today the typical proﬁle in such schools is an applicant with
Ivy League credentials and a federal appellate clerkship . . . and a
PhD if possible. All such applicants often lack any meaningful and
sustained experience in the practice of law. What connection, if any,
do you think that has to the problems you see in legal education and
scholarship?
Edwards: Over the past two decades, a number of preeminent law
schools have placed a premium on abstract scholarship and aimless
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empirical studies, even though members of the legal academy have
reason to know that much of this work is not useful to most practicing
lawyers, legislators, judges, and regulators who employ the law to
promote societal well-being. Bright, young lawyers who are seeking to
enter the academy know that this is the type of scholarship that they
must produce in order to be given serious consideration for teaching
positions at a number of law schools. The more obscure the better, it
sometimes seems.
There is certainly value in some abstract scholarship. I have never
doubted this. But it should not be preferred over other forms of
scholarship. In order for legal scholarship to be relevant outside the
legal academy, law professors should balance abstract scholarship
with scholarly works that are of interest and use to lawyers, legislators,
judges, and regulators who serve society through legal arguments,
decision-making, regulatory initiatives, and enforcement actions. In
other words, law schools, law reviews, and legal scholars should do a
better job in producing scholarship that is of interest and use to wider
audiences in society. This means that law schools must hire young
scholars who are interested in doing such work, and then value their
eﬀorts.
In addition, because young scholars are discouraged from spending
any serious time in practice, many know little about the real world of
lawyering. A sampling of tenure-track professors hired during the past
decade at forty law schools found that the median professor had three
years’ practice experience. Law schools are also hiring an increasing
number of professors who have PhDs in other ﬁelds. This is not a bad
development, unless PhDs come in droves and uniformly spurn any
interest in the law and in the issues facing the legal profession.
Unless law schools ensure that their faculties reﬂect a real balance
of talent—i.e., including professors with strengths in both concrete
and abstract scholarship and teaching—the current gulf between the
profession and the academy will continue to grow and become even
more distressing.
Collins: On a related front, in your 2014 Virginia Law Review article
you wrote: “My guess is that we will see no signiﬁcant change in the
content of what is published in the law reviews unless the law schools
change their ways.”24 Might you elaborate a bit more on that for our
readers?
Edwards: Law review editors have come to understand the law
schools’ preferences for obscure philosophical and theory-laden
material, in part because they have received so many articles of this
stripe in recent years. And the law reviews have accommodated these
forms of scholarship, largely without protest.
24.

Another Look, supra note 10, 100 VA. L. REV. at 1509.
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I do not blame the law reviews for law schools’ preferences in favor
of abstract philosophical, theoretical, and empirical scholars and
scholarship; nor do I blame the law reviews for the academy’s seeming
disdain for scholarship that focuses on issues related to professional
practice, procedure, doctrine, regulation, and legislation that would be
of more interest and greater use to wider audiences. The reviews really do
not have the leverage to change how law schools operate. The law reviews
will change their publication practices when the law schools signal that
they have a serious interest in scholarship related to professional practice,
procedure, doctrine, regulation, and legislation —i.e., scholarship beyond
just abstract philosophical, theoretical, and aimless empirical scholarship.
Collins: Professor Pierre Schlag has asserted: “I think [what]
we need to talk about is whether or not the sort of extraordinarily
reﬁned doctrinal approach that someone like Judge Harry Edwards
champions is producing anything of value.” He then added: “Is
it producing anything of value in the academy and is it producing
anything of value in the law? That is, what do we have to show for all
this doctrinal complexity apart from a massive piling on of transaction
costs? Is there anything to show for it?”25 What is your response to
that?
Edwards: Read my article in Another Look at Professor Rodell’s “Goodbye to Law
Reviews.”26 Two additional points are worth mentioning here. First, law
professors have to do more than just write for a few of their academic
colleagues. This self-indulgent approach hardly serves the needs of
the profession or society at large. Second, it is shortsighted, to say the
least, to characterize my thesis as an “extraordinarily reﬁned doctrinal
approach.”
Seeking a balance between abstract scholarship and scholarship
founded on doctrine and theory is not an endorsement of unnecessary
and burdensome doctrinal complexity. Ideally, good doctrine/
theory-focused legal scholarship brings clarity and order, not simply
“complexity,” to our systems of justice and the rule of law.
Collins: Turning to what Judge Richard Posner said in his book
Overcoming Law, he wrote: “The most interesting questions raised by
Edwards’ article is whether the shift in the emphasis in legal scholarship
at the leading law schools from the practical to the theoretical has caused
a net decline in the social value of legal scholarship.”27 Moreover, he
charged that you are “convinced . . . [that] interdisciplinary scholarship

25.

Id.

26.

Supra note 10.

27.

RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 96-97 (1995).
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[is] useless to the legal profession . . . .”28 He also suggested that you
overlooked the value of various kinds of interdisciplinary scholarship:
“He does not discuss [scholarship such as] the criticisms that
Bayesian probability theorists and cognitive psychologists have
made on the rules of evidence, jury instructions, and the burden of
proof . . . .”
“He does not discuss [scholarship such as] the impact of feminist
jurisprudence on rape law, sexual harassment, and the debate over
the legal protection of pornography. (He does not mention feminist
legal writing at all.)”
“He ignores the important role that political scientists play as
expert witnesses in reapportionment litigation.”
“And he is silent on the growing literature, which is informed
by philosophy and literary theory and also by political theory,
economics, and the theory of public choice, on the interpretation of
constitutions and statutes, even though interpretation is the major
function of the court on which Judge Edwards sits.”

How would you respond to Judge Posner?
Edwards: Judge Posner’s critique fails to capture my position. Read
my article Another Look at Professor Rodell’s “Goodbye to Law Reviews.”29 Most
of the matters that he mentions are addressed in the Virginia Law Review
essay.
Collins: In Overcoming Law Judge Posner also asked: “[W]here is it
written that all legal scholarship shall be in the service of the legal
profession? Perhaps the ultimate criterion of all scholarship is
utility, but it need not be utility to a particular audience, or even to a
contemporary audience.”30
In a 2004 interview with Washington University Law School’s Dean
Joel Seligman, you stated: “I . . . believe that there are still too many
legal scholars who tend to discuss material from non-law disciplines
without situating it in a meaningful legal context. I think that some of
this is attributable to a misguided sense of intellectual superiority.”31
Are these two views compatible or not?
Edwards: Unless Judge Posner means to say that law schools are not
professional schools, with a principal mission of educating students to
enter the legal profession, then I see no incompatibility with the two
statements. And I have never said that “all legal scholarship shall be in
28.

Id. at 96.

29.

Supra note 10.

30.

OVERCOMING LAW, supra note 38, at 99.

31.

Access to Justice: The Social Responsibility of Lawyers: A Conversation with Judge Harry T. Edwards, 16
WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 61, 73 (2004).
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the service of the legal profession.” That strikes me as a fundamentally
silly assertion.
Collins: In a 2012 article published in the Northwestern University Law
Review, Professors Lee Petherbridge and David L. Schwartz conducted
empirical research on the use of scholarly articles by Supreme Court
Justices in their published opinions. Among other things, the authors
found that Chief Justice John Roberts used “legal scholarship in about
a quarter (23.08%) of the opinions he authored” through 2010. “That
rate,” Petherbridge and Schwartz added, “does not diﬀer signiﬁcantly
from the rates of the other current Justices.”32
What do you make of those ﬁndings? Do you think they undermine
the critique against the uses and values of contemporary legal
scholarship?
Edwards: I do not make anything of the ﬁndings. Do the authors tell
us anything about how the articles are used? Do they tell us how many
of the articles are repeat citations? Do we know what percentage of all
published law review articles are cited by the Court? I suspect that the
percentage is quite low.
Actually, I would be more impressed by a study of Court of Appeals
opinions because we decide so many more cases each year than the
Supreme Court. My sense is that my colleagues and I do not often rely
on law review articles in writing our published opinions. For the year
ending December 31, 2013, the Courts of Appeals terminated almost
35,126 cases on the merits. About 12% of the terminations on the merits
were by published written decision. How many of these dispositions
relied on law review articles?
Collins: By and large, law professors write all or most of the scholarly
work they publish, whereas judicial law clerks (recent law grads,
almost all of whom were law review editors) write the lion’s share of
the opinions published by appellate judges. Do you think the quality
of judicial opinions is diminished because of the latter?
Edwards: The premises underlying the question are misguided. What
valid study shows that “judicial law clerks (recent law grads, almost all
of whom were law review editors) write the lion’s share of the opinions
published by appellate judges”? This has not been my experience and
I have not seen it to be true with my judicial colleagues. No one doubts
that good law clerks can be invaluable to a judge in assisting with legal
research and drafting. But drafts produced by law clerks should not
be confused with the opinions issued by the judges. My colleagues
and I are responsible for and attend to the writing of any opinion
that leaves chambers. The suggestion that my law clerks do the “lion’s
share” of my work is ridiculous. The truth is that no matter how bright
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they may be, most law clerks do not have either the knowledge or
experience to shoulder the “lion’s share” of the decision-making and
opinion-writing responsibilities assigned to their judges.
And what valid study shows that “law professors write all or most
of the scholarly work they publish”? During my 45 years as a law
professor, I have known of more than a few situations when research
assistants and/or law review editors have crafted large chunks of the
drafts of articles published by law professors.
Collins: Today, there are more than 1,600 legal journals published in
the United States alone, and some are released as many as eight times
annually. As you know, many law schools have multiple journals (e.g.,
Yale Law School has 11). And then there are online repositories (e.g.,
SSRN and Digital Commons). In 1997 it was estimated that American
law reviews turned out 150,000 to 190,000 pages annually.
Are too many schools publishing too many articles? If so, what do
you propose?
Edwards: I would not propose doing anything. I understand that
the range of merit in law review publications is enormous because
there are so many law schools and law journals, talent is not evenly
distributed, and article selection and editing processes vary widely.
And the proliferation of law journals has undoubtedly resulted in an
increase in the publication of articles of little value. But I am not sure
why this should bother anyone. Law reviews are not universally bad,
nor are the articles that they publish universally uninteresting and
useless. So long as researchers can ﬁnd the good works, it does not
much matter that there are many articles that are left unread.
I have already indicated that, in my view, relatively few law review
articles are cited in judicial opinions. This is not necessarily a valid
measure of the value of law reviews, however. Good articles are
potentially useful to anyone who reads them, whether or not they are
cited. And, as I note below, law review publications can serve purposes
beyond having an impact on judicial decision making.
Some critics suggest that law reviews have little inﬂuence in the
legal community in part because their circulation numbers are low. I
think this is a shortsighted view. First, law review articles can easily be
read online, so print subscriptions are a poor measure of readership.
Furthermore, even if most law journal articles are not widely read,
law reviews nonetheless have educational value: Law professors who
publish their writings often pursue research that supports their law
teaching, and these professors may also use their published works to
supplement class assignments. And students who serve on law reviews
are aﬀorded opportunities to produce notes and comments on a variety
of legal issues and to gain experience in editing. Whatever we may
think of law reviews, I strongly disagree with critics who claim that we
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should simply abolish journals as they currently exist. Throwing the
baby out with the bath water is not a viable solution.
Collins: In a 2014 interview posted on the Concurring Opinions blog,
Judge Posner declared: “The domination of academic law journal
publication by students is a scandal.”33 Do you agree? If so, what do
you recommend?
Edwards: The most signiﬁcant problem with student editors is their
limited ability to select articles for publication after having had only two
years of legal education. Many students have low knowledge depth,
for want of experience, and the capabilities of individual students
vary considerably. And to the extent that specialized knowledge and
editorial experience confer unique eﬃciencies, these are eﬃciencies
that most student-run publications cannot capture.
These are formidable obstacles that have warped the article-selection
and editing processes and promoted the publication of articles that
are of little use to the bar, bench, legislatures, and regulatory bodies.
Student editors generally are not innovators. They stick with the style
rules that have been handed down to them. Editors who might have
the talent to develop new and more appealing protocols for their
journals do not have the time to pursue their ideas, nor generally the
incentive. They are full-time students who serve as editors for no more
than twelve months. There is no simple solution, however, because
law faculty members generally are unwilling to shoulder the burdens
now carried by student editors.
Reforms may be possible, however. Apparently, there are some
law journals that have tried to involve law professors in their articleselection process to gain the beneﬁt of the professors’ expertise and
experience in assessing articles that student editors are not easily able
to evaluate. There are some pitfalls to these approaches, however,
because professors do not always have the time or interest to undertake
such reviews. And unregulated “peer review” is not always an ideal
system to assess articles that have been submitted for publication.
So where do we stand? It is unclear. Over the years, I have had
the good fortune to work with some truly outstanding student law
review editors. The truth is that the quality of work done by law
review editorial boards varies from year to year, depending upon
the leadership abilities, intellectual talents, and dedication of the
individual editors. The best of the student editors are sterling in their
work and should be commended.
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Collins: In writing the foreword to the 2009 Michigan Law Review book
issue, Dean Erwin Chemerinsky wrote: “I knew that writing that
impressed other academics was the key to advancing in my chosen
profession—pleasing those within my institution, opening the door to
moving to other schools, and fostering my reputation so that I would
receive recognition such as being invited to speak at conferences and
being thought well of by my peers in academia.”34
He added: “As I observe my more junior colleagues, I realize that
they are far more sophisticated than I was in working toward these
goals. They spend far more time than I did in making strategic choices
about topics that will lead to prominent placements and taking actions
to gain recognition. They focus much more than I ever did on the
hierarchy of law reviews and trying to draw ﬁne distinctions among
them in deciding where to publish.”35
What do you make of that?
Edwards: I largely agree with Dean Chemerinsky’s comment.
Collins: If I may draw once more on something from what Dean
Chemerinsky wrote in his foreword to the book review issue of the
Michigan Law Review: “Why should law schools require and encourage
scholarship, and what types of writings deserve recognition?”36 How
would you respond to that question?
Edwards: Legal education and good scholarship are inexorably
linked. Superior scholarship advances knowledge, tests our thinking,
encourages better decision making by public oﬃcials, leads to reforms
that serve the public good, improves teaching, and enriches our
understanding of history. Therefore, law schools should require and
encourage scholarship. Law schools, however, should remain open to
and respectful of diverse forms of scholarship to achieve the salutary
goals of education.
Collins: Writing in Dorf on Law, Professor Michael Dorf declared: “The
Growing Disjunction was a cri de coeur of an old guard.”37 Moreover, he
added: “[T]he complaints of Judge Edwards, Justice Breyer, Chief
Justice Roberts, and the other critics of legal scholarship rest on
nothing more than an occasional perusal of the covers of law reviews.
There may well be problems with legal scholarship. But the judicial
critics have not made any kind of a case. At most, they’ve sent a signal
to legal scholars that if they want to inﬂuence judges, they should title
34.

Foreword: Why Write? 107 MICH. L. REV. 881, 881 (2009).

35.

Id.

36.

Id. at 882.

37.

Judge Harry Edwards Is Still Unimpressed, supra note 11.

651

652

Journal of Legal Education
their articles something like ‘An Article That Is Super-Duper Helpful
to Judges.’”38 Your response?
Edwards: Respectfully, Professor Dorf appears to have missed the
point. I cannot speak for others, but the point that I have tried to make
over the past twenty-three years is that legal scholarship and teaching
should be balanced to accommodate the needs of the profession as a
whole (not just judges), law students, other legal scholars, and society.
I have consistently espoused the view that theoretical scholarship is
undoubtedly valuable, but that there must be a balance between theory
and concrete applications of the law. Indeed, I have explained that I do
not doubt for a moment the importance of theory in legal scholarship,
because good scholarship routinely integrates theory with doctrine.
I have also explained that I am not opposed to intensely theoretical
scholarship that does not purport to have any practical value so long
as other scholars are not discouraged from producing work that is of
greater interest and use to wide audiences. Legal scholarship should
include a healthy balance of theory, practice, procedure, policy, and
doctrine. How can this be objectionable?
Collins: Much of legal scholarship is court-centric. Often ignored is
litigation scholarship, namely, scholarship focusing on how trial and
appellate lawyers actually litigate cases. Do you think this problem
(assuming you see it as one) has anything to do with how law is taught
in most law schools?
Edwards: Scholarship and teaching focused on eﬀective techniques
of trial and appellate advocacy are important. They should be a part
of every law school’s curriculum and scholarly output. However, it is
very diﬃcult to produce good scholarship focusing on how trial and
appellate lawyers actually litigate particular cases. “True scholarship
consists in knowing not what things exist, but what they mean; it is
not memory but judgment.”39 It is too easy to fall into the trap of
“storytelling” when writing about how lawyers litigate particular cases.
Individual cases are often sui generis, so what ﬂows from the case may
not be generalizable. On the other hand, there are certain landmark
cases—Korematsu v. United States, Brown v. Board of Education, Roe v. Wade,
Bush v. Gore, Lawrence v. Texas, and Obergefell. v. Hodges—that are indelible
pieces of American history. We learn from history, both our mistakes
and our triumphs. So it certainly would make sense to encourage
scholarship that focuses on how trial and appellate lawyers litigated
landmark cases.40
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Collins: You have portrayed the legal treatise as “[t]he paradigm of
‘practical’ legal scholarship.”41 That said, are we witnessing a decline
in interest when it comes to using legal treatises? It seems that the
glorious days of the likes of treatise writers such as Blackstone, Kent,
Story, Corbin, Wigmore, and K.C. Davis are no more. And Angela
Fernandez and Markus Dubber maintain that “few if any legal scholars
in the United States today wake up ﬁlled with a burning desire to
devote their professional lives to the production of a treatise.”42
In that regard, in an April 29, 2005, letter to Justice Stephen
Breyer, Professor Laurence Tribe wrote: “[I came] to the sobering
realization that no treatise, in my sense of that term, can be true to this
moment in our constitutional history—to its conﬂicts, innovations,
and complexities.” He also added: “I do not have, nor do I believe
I have seen, a vision capacious and convincing enough to propound
as an organizing principle for the next phase in the law of our
Constitution.”43
Are treatises becoming the dinosaurs of legal scholarship? Have
electronic search engines eclipsed them?
Edwards: There are a few outstanding treatises that are still very much
in use in law practice and in judicial chambers. And some of these
treatises can be searched online. However, it is true that legal scholars
are no longer encouraged to produce legal treatises. It is a dying form
of legal scholarship.
Collins: With increasing frequency, blogging seems to be trumping
law review publications for any variety of reasons. I am thinking of
blogs such as SCOTUSblog, The Volokh Conspiracy, Balkinization, PrawfsBlawg,
LawProfessorBlogs, and Concurring Opinions, among others.
As Paul Clement noted in his foreword to A Conspiracy Against
Obamacare: “[I]f ever a legal blog and a constitutional moment were
meant for each other, it was the Volokh Conspiracy and the challenge to
the Aﬀordable Care Act.”44 What do you make of this development?
Do you think it deserves the title of “legal scholarship”?
Edwards: If blogs are taken for what they really are—news reports
and commentaries—then they have the potential to be interesting and
useful. They provide services formerly oﬀered by newspapers, namely,
reporting the news and publishing editorial comments. Blogs certainly
do not replace good scholarship found in law reviews.
41.
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The worry that I have with law blogs (as with many Internet
sites that purport to report and comment on the news) is that they
sometimes report and comment too quickly on judicial decisions.
As a result, blogs do not always capture the important nuances of an
opinion or the precedent that underlies the decision. The best way to
understand an opinion is to read it.
Collins: Apart from the Michigan Law Review’s annual book review issue,
many law reviews have ceased to publish book review essays. What are
your views concerning this brand of legal scholarship?
Edwards: In my view, a good book review is a great brand of legal
scholarship. The truth is that most books on the law do not garner
wide readership. Book reviews usefully call attention to books that
ought to command interest. Good book reviews also helpfully amplify
and critique theories, policies, and practices that are the subject of the
books being reviewed. In other words, a review gives readers some
context. Even when a review takes issue with the author of the book,
the reader invariably learns about matters that were formerly unknown
or not well understood.
Collins: In retrospect, are there any aspects of your extensive
scholarship about which you now have serious misgivings? Have you
changed your mind on anything in any signiﬁcant way?
Edwards: Not really. I do not mean to suggest that my views always
have been on the mark or that everything that I have written has been
salutary. Quite the contrary. I have learned a lot over the years as I
have probed diﬀerent areas of interest. I would like to think that my
intellectual interests and capacities have continued to grow.
In my early years in the profession, I could not have written about
some of the matters that have been of great interest to me during the
past decade because I had neither the experience nor the insights that
come from experience to tackle the issues. Some subjects that come
to mind include race and the law, empirical legal studies, judicial
collegiality, and the use of forensic disciplines in the law.
Collins: Have you ever considered writing a memoir of your many
years in the law?
Edwards: I have thought about it, but it seems a bit pretentious. I
do not think that there is anything more that I need to say beyond
what I have published in my legal scholarship, speeches, and judicial
opinions.


The Editors of the Journal of Legal Education thank Judge Edwards for ﬁrst agreeing
to be interviewed, and for taking the time to answer our questions.
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Appendix
Books, Articles, Essays, Tributes, Remembrances,
Speeches & Student Notes
by Harry T. Edwards

1.

Books
& LINDA A. ELLIOTT &, FEDERAL COURTS—STANDARDS OF REVIEW: APPELLATE COURT REVIEW OF DISTRICT COURT DECISIONS AND AGENCY
ACTIONS (2nd ed. 2013)

2.

& R. THEODORE CLARK, LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR:
CASES & MATERIALS (1991)

3.

& VIRGINIA D. NORDIN, HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE LAW (Institute
for Educational Management, Harvard Univ., 1979 & Supps., 19801983)

4. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND LABOR ARBITRATION (1980)
5.

HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE LAW (1979)

6. & JAMES J. WHITE, THE LAWYER
INGS & MATERIALS (1976)
TO

AS A

NEGOTIATOR: PROBLEMS, READ-

See also: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM: A SUPPLEMENT
HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE LAW (1980) (65 pp.)
Articles, Essays, Et cetera
1.

Another Look at Professor Rodell’s “Goodbye to Law Reviews,” 100 VA. L. REV. 1483
(2014)

2.

Reﬂections on the Findings of the National Academy of Sciences Committee on Identifying the
Needs of the Forensic Science Community, presented to First Public Meeting of the
National Commission on forensic Science (2014) (online)

3.

Tribute to Hon. Patricia M. Wald, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 1 (20102011)

4.

The National Academy of Sciences Report on Forensic Sciences: What It Means for the
Bench and Bar, 51 JURIMETRICS J. 1 (2010)

5.

Solving the Problems That Plague the Forensic Science Community, 50 JURIMETRICS 5 (2009-2010)

6. & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies That Attempt to Understand the Factors Aﬀecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895 (2009)
7.

Renewing Our Commitment to the Highest Ideals of the Legal Profession, 84 N.C.
L. REV. 1421 (2006)

8.

Professor Yale Kasimar: Awesome, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1677 (2004)
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9.

The Journey from Brown v. Board of Education to Grutter v. Bollinger:
From Racial Assimilation to Diversity, 102 MICH. L. REV. 944 (2004)

10. The Eﬀects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1639
(2003)
11. The Good and Bad of Legal Education in the United States, Presentation to
Faculty and Graduate Students at the University of Tokyo (Oct. 10,
2001), 5 CAUSA 54 (2003)
12. Deﬁning Characteristics of Federal Courts in the United States: The System of Justice
Below the Supreme Court, Presentation to Japanese American Society for Legal
Studies, Tokyo University, Japan (Oct. 13, 2001), 2002 AMERIKA HO 58
13. & Linda Elliott, Beware of Numbers (and Unsupported Claims of Judicial Bias),
80 WASH. U. L. Q. 723 (2002)
14. Reﬂections (On Law Review, Legal Education, Law Practice, and My Alma Mater),
100 MICH. L. REV. 1999 (2002)
15. Race and the Judiciary, 20 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 325 (2002)
16. Where Are We Heading with Mandatory Arbitration of Statutory Claims in Employment? 16 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 293 (1999-2000)
17. In Memoriam: Honorable Spottswood William Robinson III, 15 HARV. BLACKLETTER L. J., 25-27 (1999)
18. Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L. REV. 1335 (1998)
19. Professor Theodore J. St. Antoine: A Legendary Figure, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2192 (1998)
20. & Virginia A. Seitz, From Labor Law To Employment Law: What Next? in
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AT THE DAWN OF THE NEW MILLENNIUM (Maurice
Neufeld & Jean McKelvey eds., New York State School of Industrial and
Labor Relations, Cornell University, 1998)
21. A Tribute to My Friend, the Honorable Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 1997 ANN. SURV.
AM. L. xv (1997)
22. Comments on Mirjan Damaška’s “of Evidentiary Transplants,” 45 AM. J. COMP.
L. 853 (1997)
23. A New Vision for the Legal Profession, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 567 (1997)
24. In Memoriam: George E. MacKinnon, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 819 (1996)
25. Reﬂections on Education at the ILR School, circa 1958-1962, in CORNELL UNIVERSITY ILR SCHOOL, THE ILR SCHOOL AT FIFTY: VOICES OF THE FACULTY,
ALUMNI & FRIENDS 70 (Elaine Goldberg ed., 1996)
26. To Err Is Human, But Not Always Harmless: When Should Legal Error Be Tolerated? 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1167 (1995)
27. & Mitchell N. Berman, Regulating Violence on Television, 89 NW. U. L. REV.
1487 (1994-1995)
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28. Remarks of the Honorable Harry T. Edwards, 44 CATH. U. L. REV. 3 (1994)
29. Another “Postscript” to “The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the
Legal Profession,” 69 WASH. L. REV. 561 (1994)
30. Personal Reﬂections on 30 Years of Legal Education for Minorities, 37 MICH. L.
QUADRANGLE NOTES 38 (1994)
31. The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession: A Postscript, 91 MICH. L. REV. 2191 (1993)
32. & James B. Speta, “Our Federalism:” Doctrines of Legislative and Judicial Federalism in the United States (Comparative Lessons for “Subsidiarity” in the
European Community?) (Mentor Group Working Paper, 1993)
33. The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91
MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992)
34. Lessons of Life, 5 WASH. LAW. 12 (1991)
35. Appellate Advocacy: Good and Bad in the Court of Appeals, CAL. LAB. & EMPLOYMENT L.Q. 1 (1991)
36. The Judicial Function and the Elusive Goal of Principled Decision-making, 1991
WIS. L. REV. 837
37. A Lawyer’s Duty to Serve the Public Good, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1148 (1990)
38. Regulating Judicial Misconduct and Dividing Good Behavior for Federal Judges, 87
MICH. L. REV. 765 (1988-1989)
39. Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: The Clash Between the Public Policy
Exception and the Duty to Bargain, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3 (1988)
40. The Role of Legal Education in Shaping the Profession, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 285 (1988)
41. The Future of Aﬃrmative Action in Employment, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 763
(1987)
42. Agonizing Over the Simple Realities of Labor Relations, in THE FUTURE OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 162 (Daniel J. B. Mitchell ed., UCLA Institute of
Industrial Relations, Monograph and Research Series: 47, 1987)
43. Justice Black and Labor Law: Some Reﬂections on the Justice’s Jurisprudence of Individual Versus Collective Rights in Industrial Relations, 38 ALA. L. REV. 249
(1987)
44. & Walter Gelhorn, et al., Alternative Means of Dispute Resolution in Government: A Sense of Perspective, 1 ADMIN L. J. 459 (1987)
45. Wade H. McCree Jr.: A Model of Excellence, 86 MICH. L. REV. 227 (1987)
46. The Changing Notion of Our Federalism, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1015 (1986-1987)
47. Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema? 99 HARV. L. REV. 668
(1986)
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48. Do Lawyers Still Make a Diﬀerence? 21 WAYNE L. REV. 201 (1986)
49. Storm Warnings In Labor Arbitration, 22 ILR REPORT 2 (1986)
50. Hopes and Fears for Alternative Dispute Resolution, 21 WILLAMETTE L. REV.
425 (1985)
51. The Duty of Fair Representation: A View from the Bench, in THE CHANGING LAW
OF FAIR REPRESENTATION 93 (Jean McKelvey ed., 1985)
52. Deferral to Arbitration and Waiver of the Duty to Bargain: A Possible Way Out of
Everlasting Confusion at the NLRB, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 23 (1985)
53. Public Misperceptions Concerning the Politics of Judging: Dispelling Some Myths
about the D.C. Circuit, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 619 (1984-1985)
54. The Human Aspects of Lawyering, 61 U. DET. J. URB. L. 545 (1984)
55. Judicial Review of Deregulation, 11 N. KY. L. REV. 229 (1984)
56. The Role of a Judge in Modern Society: Some Reﬂections on Current Practice in Federal Appellate Adjudication, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 385 (1983-84)
57. The Rising Workload and Perceived “Bureaucracy” of the Federal Courts: A Causation-Based Approach to the Search for Appropriate Remedies, 68 IOWA L. REV.
871 (July 1983)
58. The Judiciary, The Law and Industrial Relations: An American Perspective, Center
for Employment Relations & Law at Florida State University, 83 CERL
FORUM (No. 2, 1983)
59. A Celebration, 27 MICH. L. QUADRANGLE NOTES 17 (Spring 1983)
60. Advantages of Arbitration Over Litigation: Reﬂections of a Judge, in ARBITRATION
1982: CONDUCT OF THE HEARING, PROCEEDINGS ON THE 35TH ANNUAL
MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 16 (James Stern & Barbara Dennis eds., BNA Books, 1983)
61. Goals in Life Worth Pursuing, 10 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 517 (1982)
62. Foreword, 31 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. vii (1981) (ASCAP)
63. A Judge’s View on Justice, Bureaucracy, and Legal Method, 80 MICH. L. REV. 259 (1981)
64. A Time for Renewed Commitment, 24 HOWARD L.J. 1 (1981)
65. Aﬃrmative Action or Reverse Discrimination: the Head and Tail of Weber, 13
CREIGHTON L. REV. 713 (1980)
66. Preferential Remedies and Aﬃrmative Action in Employment in the Wake of Bakke,
1979 WASH. U. L. Q. 113 (1979)
67. On Becoming a Lawyer: Some Challenges for the Future, 13 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 1 (1979)
68. Arbitration as an Alternative in Equal Employment Disputes, 33 ARB. J. 22 (1978)
69. The Coming of Age of the Burger Court: Labor Law Decisions of the Supreme Court
During the 1976 Term, 19 B.C. L. REV. 1 (1977-1978)
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70. Labor Arbitration at the Crossroads: The Common Law of the Shop Versus External
Law, 32 ARB. J. 65 (1977)
71. Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Cases: A Proposal for Employer and
Union Representatives, 27 LAB. L.J. 265 (1976)
72. The Cost of Equality: Civil Rights During Periods of Economic Stress, 20 MICH. L.
QUADRANGLE NOTES 5 (Winter 1976)
73. Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Cases: An Empirical Study, in ARBITRATION, 1975, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 28TH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 59 (Barbara Dennis & Gerald
Somers eds., BNA Books, 1976)
74. Race Discrimination in Employment: What Price Equality? 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 572
(1976)
75. & Barry L. Zaretsky, Preferential Remedies for Employment Discrimination, 74
MICH. L. REV. 1 (1975-1976)
76. The Impact of Private Sector Principles in the Public Sector: Bargaining Rights for
Supervisors and the Duty to Bargain, in UNION POWER AND PUBLIC POLICY
51 (D. Lipsky ed., Cornell University, School of Industrial & Labor
Relations, 1975)
77.

Substantive Legal Developments Under Title VII, 19 MICH. L. QUADRANGLE
NOTES 11 (Winter 1975)

78. The Emerging Duty to Bargain in the Public Sector, 71 MICH. L. REV.885 (1973)
79. Legal Aspects of the Duty to Bargain, in INSTITUTE OF CONTINUING LEGAL
EDUCATION, FACULTY BARGAINING IN THE SEVENTIES 21 (T. N. Tice &
G. W. Holmes eds., 1973)
80. The Emerging Law on Sex Discrimination in Employment, 17 MICH. L. QUADRANGLE NOTES 12 (Winter 1973)
81. Sex Discrimination Under Title VII: Some Unresolved Issues, 24 LAB. L.J. 411
(1973)
82. Headwinds: Minority Placement in the Legal Profession, 16 MICH. L. QUADRANGLE NOTES 14 (Spring 1972)
83. An Overview of the “Meet and Confer” States: Where Are We Going? 16 MICH. L.
QUADRANGLE NOTES 10 (Winter 1972)
84. The Developing Labor Relations Law in the Public Sector, 10 DUQ. L. REV. 357 (1971-1972)
85. Black Perspective: Justice and the Judicial System, 15 MICH. L. QUADRANGLE
NOTES 21 (Winter 1971)
86. A New Role for the Black Law Graduate—A Reality or an Illusion, 69 MICH. L.
REV. 1407 (1970-1971)
87. & Joel H. Kaplan, Religious Discrimination and the Role of Arbitration Under
Title VII, 69 MICH. L. REV. 599 (1970-1971)
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88. The Legal and Practical Remedies Available to Employers to Enforce a Contractual
No-Strike Commitment, 21 LAB. L.J. 3 (1970)
89. Due Process Considerations in Labor Arbitration, 25 ARB. J. 141 (1970)
90. & Harvey M. Adelstein, The Resurrection of NLRB v. Hearst: Independent
Contractors Under the National Labor Relations Act, 17 U. KAN. L. REV. 191
(1968-1969)
91. Recent Decisions, Trademarks—Unfair Competition—Scope of Federal Jurisdiction
Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 62 MICH. L. REV. 1094 (1964) (Student Note)
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